The Russia-Ukraine War in Germany VIII. Nuclear Escalation – the „German Angst”.

Putin’s threat of nuclear escalation – deterrence or blackmail?

Michael Gorbachev had declared in June 1991 that „the risk of global nuclear war had practically disappeared“. Now this spectre has been revived by Putin and is „haunting Europe“ (paraphrasing the communist manifesto of 1848).

The fear running rampant in Europe – as well as in the USA – of an escalation of the conventional war in Ukraine into a global nuclear Armageddon¹ is understandable. Inevitably, the question arises whether Putin is suicidal, whether he, who threatens the West with the use of nuclear weapons, can be deterred by nuclear weapons, indeed whether the balance of terror still functions at all?² It is to be feared that Putin’s nature is similar to Hitler’s – who dragged his Greater German Reich into its own downfall. A possible psychotic disorder of his instinct for self-preservation could make Putin act according to the motto: „after me, the deluge“.

In Soviet times, the rulers in the Kremlin thought rationally in this respect – they were not suicidal. Today, paranoia reigns in the Moscow Kremlin. The West still hopes that Putin’s entourage is not tired of life, that despite all the irrationality of their actions, there is still a residue of reason.

The West’s fear of nuclear escalation weakens its willingness to supply weapons to Ukraine; that is the purpose of Russian threats about Russia’s nuclear potential. But the implication of no longer supplying weapons – heavy or light, offensive or defensive is completely irrelevant – to Ukraine is wrong. Such a decision would not persuade Putin to end the war against Ukraine, but on the contrary encourage him to continue the conventional war.

Claudia Major – the head of the security policy research group of the German „Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik“ / SWP speaks of nuclear blackmail: Already talking about nuclear weapons is a weapon. The nuclear threat is to be taken seriously, but no reason to panic. In order to interpret Putin’s nuclear threats, it is necessary to observe what he does, not what he says. According to Claudia Major, nuclear weapons are not „weapons of warfare“ but „weapons of war prevention“. The use of nuclear weapons – even tactical ones – would be a „breach of civilisation“. Putin is certainly not afraid of such a breach – the invasion of Ukraine was already a „breach of civilisation“.

Walter Slócombe, the former US under secretary of defence, does not consider such a „taboo-breaking“, the crossing of the „nuclear threshold“, to be entirely improbable in the event that a military defeat poses an existential threat to Putin’s regime („below 5% – but conceivable“). He might be inclined to shock the Western public with a demonstrative nuclear strike with limited damage.

Putin has not yet „armed“ Russian nuclear weapons –  i.e. ordered „stage 2“ of „combat readiness“; he has not yet had the links in the chain of command, the „command links“, established in order to be able to issue the launch order at all, to press the „red button“, explains Gustav Gressel, an expert on Eastern Europe and the military.³

The Inspector General of the German „Bundeswehr“, Eberhard Zorn, stated that Putin’s nuclear threat is „not immediately“ worrying.  Zorn also thinks Putin is using this threat as a psychological bargaining chip. But he too said, „We take this statement seriously“.

„Verdun“ –  Putin’s war of attrition

Putin obviously counted on being able to take the Ukrainian capital Kiev in a „blitzkrieg“, depose (perhaps even kill) Ukrainian President Selenskyj, bring about a pro-Russian change of government and thus gain control over the whole of Ukraine.

While the capture of Kiev (in the north of the country) failed due to unexpected Ukrainian resistance from the Ukrainian army (and thanks to the targeting of civilians), in the first days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 5 March, Russian troops occupied the strategically important port city of Kherson, located on the right bank of the Dnipro River, as well as the entire Kherson oblast, located north of the peninsula, securing a land bridge between Russia and Crimea, which are separated by 300 kilometres of Ukrainian territory under international law. (Bay of Taganrog, port city in the bay where the Don flows into the Sea of Azov in the Rostov-on-Don oblast in southern Russia). In September 2022, Moscow annexed the Russian-occupied Kherson oblast in violation of international law.

Under pressure from the Ukrainian counter-offensive launched on 29 August, the situation of the Russian troops became untenable; they were threatened with encirclement. The Ukrainian attacks on the Antonivs’kyj Bridge had massively hampered the supply of Russian troops on the right bank. On 9 November 2022, the Russian commander-in-chief, General Sergei Surovikin announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from the city of Kherson and the right-bank areas of the oblast.

Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu declared hypocritically: „The lives and health of the soldiers of the Russian Federation have always been a priority,“ he justified his order to withdraw on Russian state television.

The oblast capital Kherson (before the war 280,000 inhabitants) was occupied – under the protest of the majority Russian-speaking population – more quickly than any other part of the country. How this could happen is still unclear today. Russian units were able to advance unhindered from the annexed Crimea hundreds of kilometres into the Kherson oblast (with access to two seas, the Black Sea and the Azov Sea). The „gate to Crimea“ was „wide open“; the isthmus of Perekop, which connects the Ukrainian mainland with the peninsula, could presumably have been „easily“ closed off by the Ukrainian army.

By 24 February 2023, the anniversary of the Russian invasion, the capture of the city of Kherson remained the last success of Ukrainian forces (until the end of March 2023). Russian forces shifted to the defence of the occupied part of the Donbas and the complete conquest of the parts of the two Donbas oblasts of Donetsk and Luhans’k still under Ukrainian control. Russia switched to a war of attrition. And just as the name of the little town of „Butscha“ (Buča) came to epitomise the site of Russian war crimes, so the name of the front-line town of „Bachmut“ came to epitomise the war of attrition – a „second Verdun“.

Putin seems to think that in the long run the West will tire of supporting Ukraine, reduce its arms supplies and push Ukraine to a ceasefire. Perhaps Putin intends to drag out the war until 2024 – and another American president, a new “Trumpist”, or possibly even the old Trump himself, will „leave“ Ukraine to him – a concern that worries Ukrainians and their government more than a possible nuclear escalation.

The battle for the completely destroyed city of Bachmut, which has been going on for nine months (by the end of march 2023) without any gains in terrain for either side, is reminiscent of the trench warfare in World War I: „It’s like Verdun out there,“ medics are said to have told war correspondents.⁴  Victory has only symbolic significance for both sides, says Mark Cancian of the US think tank „Center for Strategic and International Studies“.

Russian soldiers and mercenaries (“Vagner”) greatly outnumber the Ukrainian soldiers; they do not seem to have a shortage of weapons and ammunition, as Ukrainian soldiers complain. „Western weapons, which President Selenskyj keeps calling for, are coming too late,“ says ZDF correspondent Katrin Eigendorf.⁵ The number of fallen soldiers is not disclosed by either side; they both agree that the battle for Bachmut is the bloodiest of the entire war so far.

The West’s strategic war goal: Russia’s defeat in Ukraine

If the military situation should change in favour of Russia, the conquest of the whole of Ukraine is in the offing. Predictably, in the event of a Russian victory, Ukraine will split into annexed parts in the east (including Kharkiv) and south (including Odessa) and pseudo-autonomous entities in the „rest of Ukraine“ cut off from the sea.

Putin’s certainly not abandoned military goal is the conquest of the Odessa oblast and the establishment of a land connection up to the Moldavian secession territory „Transnistria“, which has been under Russian control since its de facto independence (1992) (14th Russian Army).

How long the Ukrainian army can hold out against Russian forces depends on the supply of weapons from the West. And Putin seems to believe that Russia has the longer breath in a war of attrition – and that the West, specifically the governments of the Western allies – under pressure from their societies weary of the „foreign“ war –  will eventually cut down or stop supporting Ukraine altogether.

The Western governments must, on the one hand,  make Russia believe that they will not abandon the Ukrainians on the front lines in the longer term, and, on the other hand, make clear to their own populations the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat. As long as Putin is in power, there will be no real peace, and if he should win in Ukraine, he will carry the war – at least in hybrid form – to the West. The „consequences“ for Western societies would be such as they have „never experienced in their history,“ Putin had threatened in his declaration of war on 24 February 2022.

From this follows the West’s strategic goal in the Ukraine war: Russia must be defeated in Ukraine! The vague political phrase invented by dithering politicians – „Ukraine must not lose“ or „Russia must not win“ –  must finally be replaced as the goal of Western military support by a clear formulation of the goal that Europe’s citizens can understand: Putin must be beaten back in Ukraine; Russian forces must suffer defeat on Ukrainian soil.

Putin’s fluid „red lines“ – in Western perception

The Kremlin adapts its narratives for its war to the military situation. The question of Putin’s „red lines“, which worries Western politicians when it comes to arms deliveries to Ukraine, is idle: „Putin knows no red lines”⁶, wrote the British Russia expert Nigel Gould-Davies in the New York Times of 9 January 2023. „In my opinion, Putin’s red lines are not a credible threat, but an attempt to stir up fear of an […] escalation,“ says Gould-Davies in an interview with “Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland”.⁷ Putin is threatening to use nuclear weapons to reduce Western support for Ukraine. Nigel Gould-Davies thinks Moscow’s threats are a big bluff. „The West can ensure that the costs, consequences and risks to Russia of implementing these threats significantly outweigh the benefits Putin hopes to reap,“ Gould-Davies says, advising consistent and unequivocal deterrence rather than fearful restraint.

Crossing the nuclear threshold, he says, is the West’s greatest concern; and this is fuelled by Putin. In particular, it is the „German Angst“ (fear), already proverbial abroad, that Putin is stirring up with the help of his Fifth Column of useful idiots. In Germany, Putin is particularly successful with his „red line“ rhetoric. Worried about escalation, the chancellor long refused to supply battle tanks to Ukraine.

Those who spin tales of worry that a red line would be crossed with Russia (with the delivery of battle tanks) are telling the story of the aggressor, not that of the victims,“ said the chairperson of the Defence Committee, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP), in an interview. Obviously, the Russian narrative was working in the Chancellery. It was not only the German government that allowed itself to be deterred by Russia’s supposed red lines when deciding which weapons to supply to Ukraine. The USA, too, has still not provided Ukraine with certain long-range weapons. For other weapons, such as the „Himars“ missile launchers, they are said to have limited the range. This, she said, is proof of how red-line thinking influences political decisions.

Putin criticised the West several times in recent months for not taking Russia’s red lines seriously enough. In fact, Putin’s – supposed –  red lines have been crossed several times by Ukraine and the West; but all the threatened horror scenarios have so far failed to materialise. Gould-Davies warns: „If important voices in the West begin to take the threats seriously and argue for greater restraint or understanding of Putin’s demands, this will only encourage Putin to continue these threats.“ Russia should not be allowed to set the limits of Western policy, the IISS expert urges.

The sacralised Crimea⁸ – Putin’s last „red line“?

Whether a Ukrainian attempt to reconquer Crimea, which has been sacralised in Russia, is Putin’s „last red line“, beyond which he will launch a „maximum (unspoken: nuclear) counterattack“, as prophesied by Alice Schwarzer and Sahra Wagenknecht in their „Manifesto for Peace“, is conceivable, but not certain. The reaction to the attack on Putin’s prestige object, the new bridge over the Kerch Strait, was the unleashing of air strikes on civilian infrastructure throughout Ukraine.

By „bringing home“ Crimea in 2014, Putin managed to win the approval of almost the entire Russian population – including that of the opposition to his regime. He himself has increased the existing Russian myth of „Crimea“ and even exaggerated it religiously. He will do „anything“ (?) to hold on to the peninsula – and in the case of a loss of the Russian „gem“ Crimea, he would probably also face the loss of his power.

For Ukraine, Crimea has no comparable emotional „status“. Kyiv is primarily concerned with its claim to the peninsula under international law, which was awarded to it (the then Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic / USSR) in 1954 by the then First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union / CPSU, Nikita Chruščëv.

When Crimea (with the port city of Sevastopol) was carved out of the RSFSR and annexed to the USSR, it was still completely destroyed by the war (WW II). According to Rory Finnin⁹, Khruščëv was outraged by the desolate state of affairs; Finnin quotes Dmitry Stepanovič Poliansky, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Crimean Oblast Council (1952 – 1954).¹⁰  Khruščëv had concluded that „Russia had paid little attention to the development of Crimea“ and that „Ukraine could handle the matter in a more concentrated way“. 

When Tsarina Catherine II annexed the Crimean Khanate in 1783, it included not only the Crimean peninsula but the adjacent steppe on the „mainland“ (materik) along the Black and Azov Seas, a large part of southern Ukraine today.

Soviet leaders had to realise that Russian Crimea was not a self-sufficient island, but had to be supplied from the Ukrainian hinterland. The Crimean Tatars called this steppe Özü Qirlöari (also Özü çölleri) –  „Dnipro Land“. The arid Crimea depended on the water of the Dnipro River, which flows into the Black Sea south of Kherson. Geologically, Crimea is an extension of the southern Ukrainian steppe.

Three years after the „annexation“ of Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in 1957, the construction of the North Crimean Canal¹¹ near Kherson was started, through which 85% of the peninsula is irrigated with Dnipro water. The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was neither a „gift“ nor a „mistake“ on Khruščëv’s part, as the Russian side later put it. „It was a rescue,“ writes Finnin.¹² 

On the very first day of the February 2022 invasion, Russian troops advanced – largely without resistance –  into Kherson oblast, north of the peninsula on the „mainland“ („materik“), and took control of this critical waterway; they thus acknowledged „a fundamental reality: Crimea must be connected to the Ukrainian mainland in order to thrive, indeed to survive.“¹³

Therefore, should negotiations take place, not only the Crimean peninsula will be high on the agenda, but also its northern – Ukrainian –  hinterland, the Kherson oblast.

A conceivable solution to the „Crimean question“ (always including the port city of Sevastopol) could be a new referendum –  totally monitored by international election observers and with a total ban on any –  open – political influence. It is conceivable that Russia might agree to this –  trusting in the Russian majority in Crimea.

Tactical nuclear weapons  –  psychological warfare

Tactical nuclear weapons are desined for psychological warfare, explains Marina Henke, Director of the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School.

A first use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia must be immediately followed by a nuclear counter-attack, demands former Deputy Secretary of Defence (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1994 – 2001) Walter Becker Slócombe – calibrated to reduce the risk of further escalation. If this did not happen, the credibility of deterrence –  nuclear retaliation by the US – would be weakened, not only among allies but also in Moscow. And this would only make the feared nuclear war more likely. A certain ambiguity in Western rhetoric is more deterrent than its unambiguity; ambiguity is called for with regard to the type and scope, conventional or nuclear, of the Western response to a Russian first strike. The Western allies must already agree on response options now – so that they are not paralysed by indecision in an emergency, Slócombe demands.

The danger of Putin dropping a „small“ nuclear bomb –  even as a threat over the Baltic Sea – is real. The American political scientist Richard K. Betts¹⁴ demands that planning be made for this contingency. The danger would be highest if the war took a turn in favour of Ukraine.¹⁵  Betts also thinks it possible that in order to avoid defeat, Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against the Ukrainian army – „or set off a symbolic explosion“ over an empty space (Baltic Sea?) in order to terrify Ukraine and its Western supporters. Will he react like a cornered rat if his forces are threatened with defeat in Ukraine? The young Putin already had his experience with rats: „Once I discovered a huge rat (in the house entrance) and started chasing it until I had cornered it. Now it could no longer escape. Then it suddenly reared up and went at me.“¹⁶ 

With the current Russian doctrine – „escalate to de-escalate“ –  Russia is imitating NATO’s Cold War concept of „flexible response“, which in principle was based on the option of intentional escalation –  starting with the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of stopping a superior conventional Soviet invasion. This strategy was controversial because the first use of nuclear weapons could culminate in an apocalyptic end-time war. It was nevertheless adopted because the West believed its conventional forces were inferior to the Warsaw Pact.

J. Michael Legge, a former member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, noted in a 1983 study for the RAND Corporation that the group was unable to reach agreement on the follow-up options to a psychological „demonstration shot“ for fear of a Russian nuclear retaliation. „Today, it is hoped that this old dilemma will deter Moscow from being the first to unleash the nuclear demon.

Richard Betts advises not to rely on Moscow’s restraint. Putin the Russian might be inclined to play „Russian roulette“ with Washington, viewing a nuclear shock as an acceptable risk to end the war in Ukraine on his terms.

Would the first use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia really be a red line for the West, asks Betts. If the US left it at a verbal condemnation of Russian barbarism and did nothing, it would signal complete military freedom of action for Moscow. Washington would thus be conceding victory to Russia in Ukraine (while the US government now proclaims that Russia must not be allowed to win in Ukraine). To deter Putin from a nuclear gambit, the West must make it as credibly clear as possible that a Russian first use of nuclear weapons would not intimidate NATO, but would result in a nuclear counter-strike, advises Betts.

If NATO were to retaliate nuclear to save Ukraine, this should not be the destruction of comparable Russian objects – on the principle of „an eye for an eye“, as this would lead to a gradually swelling exchange of blows and ultimately the devastation of both sides, says Betts. If the US were to respond to a Russian first strike on Ukrainian territory with a more powerful counter-strike, it would inflict immense collateral damage on its Ukrainian protégés. (It was a serious problem for Germany in the Cold War.) If, on the other hand, American nuclear weapons were to be used against targets on Russian territory, this would increase the risk of a borderless nuclear war.

Another problem, Betts explains, is that Russia possesses more tactical nuclear weapons than the USA. This asymmetry could force Washington to resort more quickly to strategic nuclear weapons (intercontinental missiles). This would result in the mutual destruction of Russia and the USA.

Betts concludes that both the „strike“ option and excessive retaliation carry extreme risks. Therefore, dishonourable submission might be accepted by the American people to avoid the ultimate risk of national suicide. Betts does not think this is out of the question.

In the event of a Russian nuclear first strike, NATO has two conflicting objectives: On the one hand, NATO will want to counter any strategic benefit Moscow might derive from a nuclear first strike. On the other hand, NATO will want to avoid further escalation. Hence the obvious need to maximally deter Moscow from a first deployment, argues Betts.

NATO’s main task is credible deterrence. Under no circumstances should the West show weakness. But Washington must keep threats vague enough to remain flexible. „Putin must be reminded again and again that a nuclear war has no winner.

Conventional response to a Russian nuclear attack

The US should make clear to the Kremlin that modern conventional, i.e., non-nuclear precision weapons are superior to tactical nuclear weapons because they can destroy Russian military targets in a more targeted manner than weapons of mass destruction, Betts urges.

A conventional war between Russia and the US appears „weaker“ than nuclear retaliation, but it increases Russia’s fear of defeat rather than diminishing it. This would leave Russia’s eventual motivation for nuclear escalation.

A possible solution to the dilemma could be the offer of „cosmetic concessions“ by NATO; the advantage of a conventional option would be that the risk of nuclear escalation would be lower than with the options of „nuclear retaliation“ or „inaction“, Betts concludes in his profound essay in Foreign Affairs in early July 2022.

1. Greek Armagedṓn, borrowed from the Hebrew. John, Apocalypse, chapter 16, verse 16.
2. MAD-Doctrine (mutually assured destruction).
3. Stephanie Munk: Russlands Warnung vor der „schmutzigen Bombe“: Militärexperte erklärt Putins Strategie (Russia’s „dirty bomb“ warning: military expert explains Putin’s strategy), in: Merkur.de, 27.10.2022; https://www.merkur.de/politik/russland-putin-ukraine-krieg-schmutzige-bombe-atomwaffen-warnung-propaganda-gustav-gressel-zr-91875675.html.
4. ZDF heute, 14 February 2023; https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/bachmut-schlacht-verdun-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html.
5. https://www.dw.com/de/cherson-das-strategisch-wichtige-tor-zur-krim/a-63057197.
6. Sven Christian Schulz: „Putin kennt keine roten Linien“, Kommentar zu Nigel Gould-Davies’ Gastbeitrag (commentary on Nigel Gould-Davies‘ op-ed „Vladimir Putin has no ‚red lines’“),  in: New York Times, 08 January 2023; in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 08 JANUARY 2023; https://www.fr.de/politik/putin-kennt-keine-roten-linien-92016364.html.
7. Nigel Gould-Davies is Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, London) and Editor of the Institute’s “Strategic Survey”.
8. See Winfried Schneider-Deters: Ukraine’s Fateful Years 2013 – 2019, Stuttgart (IBIDEM) 2022, Volume II, Chapter II.
9. Rory Finnin: Why Crimea Is the Key to Peace in Ukraine, Opinion in: Politico Magazine, 13.01.2023; https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/01/13/peace-ukraine-crimea-putin-00077746. Rory Finnin is associate professor of Ukrainian studies an der University of Cambridge.
10. Predsedatel’ Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta Krymskogo oblastnogo Soveta (1952-1954) and First Secretary of the Crimean Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (1954-1955).
11. Russ.: Severo-Krymskij kanal / SKK; Ukr.: Pivnično-Kryms’kyj kanal / PKK.
12. Rory Finnin: Why Crimea Is the Key to Peace in Ukraine, Opinion in: Politico Magazine, 13.01.2023; https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/01/13/peace-ukraine-crimea-putin-00077746. Rory Finnin ist associate professor of Ukrainian studies an der University of Cambridge.
13. Ibid.
14. Richard Kevin Betts is currently the Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the Department of Political Science and Director of the International Security Policy Program at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in Washington D.C.; Betts was Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies from 1991 to 2013.
15. Richard K. Betts: Thinking About the Unthinkable in Ukraine. What Happens If Putin Goes Nuclear? In: Foreign Affairs, July 4, 2022; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-07-04/thinking-about-unthinkable-ukraine.
16. Natalija Geworkjan, Andrej Kolesnikow, Natalja Timakowa:  Aus erster Hand. Gespräche mit Wladimir Putin (First-hand. Conversations with Vladimir Putin), Munich (Heyne Verlag) 2000.