The Russia-Ukraine War in Germany IV. How far is the West prepared to go? –  the „war goal“ of the supporters of Ukraine. 

The „war goal“ of Ukraine

„Winning the war“ for Ukraine means using all military means to prevent Putin from bringing the country – even partially –  under his control, i.e. to thwart the Russian war aim, namely the subjugation of the whole of Ukraine.

From this war goal of Ukraine must follow the „war goal of the West“, actually the „goal of military support for Ukraine“: To assist Ukraine, through the supply of modern weapons, to drive all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. NATO member countries simply cannot demand anything else from Ukraine, having repeatedly stated emphatically that they would defend every square inch of NATO territory against an attack by Russia.

A Ukrainian „victory“, i.e., pushing Russian troops back behind the Russian-Ukrainian border, means a territorially „limited“ defeat of Russia, a defeat on Ukrainian soil. For obvious reasons, a Russian defeat on Ukrainian territory must not be followed – in the interest of Ukraine and its Western allies – by a counterattack of the Ukrainian army on Russian territory, which the West would hardly allow for fear of a nuclear escalation.

While the Ukrainian President Selenskyj has declared the liberation of the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine as his goal, the Western allies leave the question open as to which „border“ they mean, up to which „border“ they are prepared to support Ukraine militarily:

1. restoration of the status quo ante (before 24 February 2022) – i.e. up to the „line of contact“ between the part of the Donbas that remained under Kiev control until 24 February and the internationally unrecognised „Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics“ („DNR“ and „LNR“);

2. recapture of the secessionist territories in the Donbas already occupied by Russia since 2014, the so-called „DNR“ and „LNR“;

3. reconquest of Crimea.

Western Ambiguity on the „Crimea Question”

Statements by key Western politicians about war aims are generally vague, which provides Russian propaganda with welcome starting points. They are particularly ambiguous, when it comes to Crimea. On the question of whether the West would support Ukraine militarily in an attempt to retake Crimea annexed by Russia, both US President Biden¹ and European leaders are conspicuously silent.

Some experts, according to Chris Chivvis², explain the official „ambiguity“ on the „Crimea issue“ as a negotiating tactic, or more precisely as a bargaining chip to get Putin to the negotiating table in the first place – even if they do not really believe that Crimea can be reclaimed militarily from Ukraine.

In a video message to the United Nations General Assembly, Ukrainian President Selenskyj declared: „We can return the Ukrainian flag to our entire territory. We can do it with the force of arms.“ He repeated this conviction in a video appearance at the World Economic Forum in January 2023: „Crimea is our land, our territory […] we will return what is ours.“

Even though US representatives have asserted that they will support Ukraine for as long as it takes to win the war, they have avoided pledging full support for the Ukrainian reconquest. National security adviser Jake Sullivan (on NBC’s „Meet The Press“ in February 2023) sidestepped the question of whether the Biden administration would support that goal: „The critical thing right now is that they need to take back the territory in the south and the east that they are currently focused on, and we need to give them the tools to be able to do that,“ Sullivan said.

The US Department of Defence is also holding back on this issue: in January 2023, Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh dodged a question about the US military’s stance on the issue with the phrase: „We don’t dictate to the Ukrainians how to run their operations.“ In reality, the US determines what Ukraine can or cannot do by supplying the country with the necessary weapons to do so or not.

By withholding long-range weapons from Ukraine, the US itself is causing the doubts about Ukraine’s ability to retake Crimea militarily, such as those publicly expressed by House Armed Services Committee member Adam Smith. The US „leaves the door open for peace negotiations“ is the official description of this „strategy“

„War goal“ – incompatibility between the Western and Ukrainian definitions?

According to Vladimir Socor (Jamestown Foundation), a large gap exists between the Western and Ukrainian definitions of what „success“ means in Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s war of aggression.³

While initial restrictions on arms deliveries have been relaxed over time, „talks“ between Ukraine’s Western allies now hint at time limits for the duration of the defensive war. Ukraine would be given a chance for a counter-offensive in the summer (2023), through which it could recapture an unspecified part of its mainland territory. After that, however, Ukraine would be expected to be ready for ceasefire negotiations, even if part of the Ukrainian mainland would still be in Russian hands; the „red line“ of Crimea should not be „crossed“ according to most Western leaders, Socor claims.

Western governments have not yet defined what a successful outcome of the war is for Ukraine and ipso facto for themselves, Socor says. They would avoid the word „victory“ and mantrically repeat that „Russia must not win and Ukraine must not lose“. They would talk about support for regaining Ukraine’s sovereignty, but not about restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Instead, they talk about never recognising Russia’s annexations of Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin interprets this as tacit acceptance of the faits accomplis he has created; Putin can live well with this legalistic non-recognition policy.

Some NATO member countries were apparently prepared to sign guarantees for the security of the „rest of Ukraine“ after negotiating a ceasefire. This is a far cry from NATO membership for Ukraine, which remains „a long-term perspective“ according to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. 

According to a series of polls by respectable institutes,⁴ the implied ideas of authoritative Western politicians contrast with the ideas of both the Ukrainian leadership and the Ukrainian population; the poll results document a high degree of congruence between Ukraine’s citizens and government. In the NDI-KIIS poll, 86% of respondents were in favour of NATO membership after the war. The same percentage, 86% was found in the Rating Group survey.

The „incrementalism“ of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz

Time counts now – and delays make time work for Putin, cost more Ukrainians their lives, cause more destruction in Ukraine. Dithering and hesitating is not wisdom in the situation Ukraine finds itself in, but a mistake.

Sarah Pagung, Russia expert of the Körber Foundation, said in the „Phoenix-Runde“ on  February 2, 2023 („Discussion about fighter jets. How far will the West go?“) the strategic debate, namely the discussion of the question „up to what point should we support Ukraine?“ was missing in Germany. The answer to this question would determine the type and extent of support.

Prof. Nicole Deitelhoff, Director of the Leibniz Institute Hessian Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research (HSFK / PRIF), contradicted Pagung in the discussion: this strategic debate on how far the West should go in supporting Ukraine with weapons was not only being conducted in the USA, but also in Germany.

The description of the Chancellor’s tactics so far, criticised by Palang, as a „piecemeal approach“ is of course correct, but if one does not want to neglect the danger of a possible escalation of the war beyond Ukraine’s borders, then „salami tactics are called for“, argued Deitelhoff; then one must be hesitant (for example, in the delivery of combat aircraft), then one must „proceed step by step“, „drive on sight“, and see what certain decisions trigger in the warring parties, „how they materialise in the field“, before making further decisions. This is actually a „strategically smart practice“. Asked by moderator Alexander Kähler whether she thought Olaf Scholz’s approach was right, Deitelhoff replied that this kind of approach by Olaf Scholz was certainly „justified“, only the way he communicated it was far from optimal. But „the actual strategy of saying we are not going all in“, we are not delivering everything we have in order to enable Ukraine to win somehow, but rather we first look at every decision to see what is happening on the ground, what effects a decision will have, I think that is very clever in view of the initial situation“.

This reasoning may be wise for a civilian or biological development project, but not in a war in which Ukraine’s existence is at stake – and in which for all of Europe the consequences are „such as the last three generations have never experienced“ – to paraphrase Putin.  In response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the „salami tactic“ is not“ clever” but ill-advised. 

The „gradual“ extension of military support prolongs the war. The West must enable the Ukrainian forces to counterattack by rapidly delivering superior weapons. „Western leaders need to shift how they approach the conflict. At this stage, incrementally expanding military and economic assistance is likely to only prolong the war indefinitely, writes Michael McFaul, the former US ambassador to Moscow⁵ (2012 – 2014). 

Without immediate aid, the war will end in a stalemate that is only to Putin’s advantage, McFaul argues. „[I]n 2023, the United States, NATO, and the democratic world more broadly should aim to support a breakthrough. This means more advanced weapons, more sanctions against Russia, and more economic aid to Ukraine. None of this should be done incrementally. It needs to be provided swiftly, so that Ukraine can win decisively on the battlefield this year. Without greater and immediate support, the war will settle into a stalemate, which is only to Putin’s advantage.“⁶

„Scholz’s Procrastination“ – a mental problem or tactical calculation?

On 19 January 2023, the British historian Timothy Garton Ash⁷ posted on Twitter the satirical meme „scholzing“, which a Ukrainian friend had sent him via WhatsApp.⁸

The verb „to scholz“, which could be read in Ukrainian media⁹ as early as mid-2022, reflected Ukrainians‘ frustration with Scholz’s way of announcing good intentions only to delay their implementation.

In his answer to the title question „What now, Mr Scholz?“ in „ZDF heute journal“ on 25 January 2023, Olaf Scholz translated the word „Scholzing“, with which the presenters confronted him, as „Germany does the most“.¹⁰

Germany does a lot, but it is the least that can be expected from the largest economy in the European Union; however, the self-righteous claim „most“ is simply wrong – „most“ is done by the „non-European“ USA for European Ukraine. 

It is only thanks to US military support that Ukraine is not fully occupied by Russia today –  notwithstanding the courage of the Ukrainian armed forces, as Garton Ash rightly writes. It is a shame that three quarters of a century after the end of World War II, Europeans still rely on the US to defend European freedom.

In the current situation, time is essential; „time is of the essence and delay makes time work for Putin“, Garton Ash writes. Slow, careful decision-making may be good in peacetime, but in war it benefits the enemy. The delivery of battle tanks could have been prepared six months ago. Now it may come too late to repel the expected second Russian spring offensive.

As a result of the German chancellor’s hesitancy, the current year has seen a trench warfare, reminiscent of the horrors of the First World War. Putin will be able to hold on to part of the Ukrainian territory that his troops have occupied since 24 February 2022, and this will allow him to pass off the reconquest of at least part of „New Russia“ („Novorossiya“) as a „victory“ and keep himself in power, writes Garton Ash.

There are also quite a few „Scholzers“ (Garton Ash) in the Biden administration, not to mention brakemen in other European capitals.

1. Ellen Mitchell: Why Biden is ambiguous on Ukraine’s Crimea question, in “The Hill”, 05.03.2023; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3884764-why-biden-is-ambiguous-on-ukraines-crimea-question/.
2. Chris Chivvis was U.S. national intelligence officer in Europe; he is currently director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank, Washington D.C.
3. Vladimir Socor: Official Western Views Diverge With Ukrainian Views On War Outcomes (Part One), in: Eurasia Daily Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation), Volume 20, Issue 37, March 2, 2023.
4. The Munich Security Index 2023, prepared with Ukrainian partners by the Munich-based „Kekst communications agency“ on behalf of the Munich Security Conference, November 2022. The Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) in cooperation with the Razumkov Center and with the Dutch Matra Program, mid-December 2022. The American Democratic Institute (NDI) in cooperation with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), first half of January 2023. The Sociological Group Rating, mid-January 2023.
5. Michael McFaul: How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine. The Case against incrementalism, in: Foreign Affairs, 03.02.2023; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-breakthrough-ukraine.
6. Ibid.

7. Timothy Garton Ash: I went viral in Germany for a meme about Scholzing – but the chancellor’s hesitancy over Ukraine is no joke, in: The Guardian, 03.02.2023; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/03/germany-olaf-scholz-twitter-ukraine. Timothy Garton Ash is a Professor of European Studies at Oxford University. Central and Eastern Europe are the focus of his research in contemporary history.

8. „ZDF heute“, 25.01.2023, Was nun, Herr Scholz? Fragen an den Bundeskanzler von Bettina Schausten und Anne Gellinek (What now, Mr Scholz? Questions to the Federal Chancellor by Bettina Schausten and Anne Gellinek); https://www.zdf.de/politik/was-nun/was-nun-herr-scholz-136.html.
9. Business Ukraine Mag, 9 June 2022; https://twitter.com/Biz_Ukraine_Mag/status/1534685426665066499. „Business Ukraine Magazine“ is a quarterly journal published in Ukraine.
10. ZDF, heute Journal update vom 25. Januar 2023; https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/heute-journal/heute-journal-vom-25-januar-2023-100.html. https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/heute-journal-update/heute-journal-update-vom-25-januar-2023-100.html.